@constructive-io/simple-email-fn
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@launchql/postmaster | AI (dependencies): @launchql/postmaster is from the same publisher ecosystem (pyramation/launchql); stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for this publisher's packages; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.6.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.6.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.6.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.6.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.6.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.5.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.5.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.3.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.2.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.1.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.4.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.4.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 1 |
v1.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.