@contentful/field-editor-date
```bash npm install @contentful/field-editor-date ```
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @emotion/css is a direct, well-known replacement for the removed `emotion` dep; no supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Contentful org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD; consistent with org-wide automation pattern across their packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@contentful/f36-components | AI (dependencies): First-party Contentful design system dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Contentful publishes via GitHub Actions CI; provenance absence is consistent across their package ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.19 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.18 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.17 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.16 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.15 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.14 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.13 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.12 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.11 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.10 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.9 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.8 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.7 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.6 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.5 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.4 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.9.25 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.9.24 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.9.23 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.9.22 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.9.21 | 5 / 5 |
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.