@convex-dev/crons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are Convex org employees (username pattern *-convex); internal team rotation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of ballingt paired with Convex org additions is consistent with internal handoff, not takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Component library with infrequent releases; dormancy aligns with org-level maintenance cadence, not compromise. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Legitimate @convex-dev scoped cron scheduler; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental. | ai |
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.