@cordisjs/plugin-webui-sso
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-f6swi6cg.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/rollup minified Vue frontend bundle; content is clearly SSO UI code, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-f6swi6cg.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are fetch() to /sso/* endpoints; no dynamic code execution beyond normal Vue rendering. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling previously external deps (simplewebauthn, qrcode) into dist. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance is a legitimate supply-chain improvement, not a takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-dc3mmlem.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/Rollup minified frontend bundle for a webui plugin; content is clearly Vue+SSO logic. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@simplewebauthn/browser | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled into dist; phantom-dep false positive for bundled frontend deps. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:qrcode | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled into dist; phantom-dep false positive for bundled frontend deps. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-dc3mmlem.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are fetch() to /sso/* endpoints; no dynamic code execution beyond normal Vue rendering. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-n1xpe4pz.js | AI (source-diff): Minified @simplewebauthn/browser bundle; WebAuthn credential handling, not obfuscated malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 3 |
v0.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.