@cubejs-backend/schema-compiler
Cube schema compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): antlr4ts is the TypeScript ANTLR4 runtime, directly referenced in the generate script for grammar compilation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:antlr4ts | AI (dependencies): antlr4ts is the standard TypeScript ANTLR4 runtime; its use is consistent with the grammar generation toolchain in this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Cube.js migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Long-lived monorepo package; dormancy reflects release cadence, not account takeover. SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI publish. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/core | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped babel package loaded by convention in this schema compiler; stable false positive. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-package; link-dump README and no keywords are expected for internal packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/preset-env | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped babel package loaded by convention; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/standalone | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped babel package loaded by convention; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:humps | AI (phantom-deps): humps is a runtime dep used transitively in this monorepo package; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 111)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.55 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.54 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.53 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.52 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.51 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.50 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.49 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.48 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.47 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.46 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.45 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.44 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.43 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.42 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.41 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.40 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.39 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.38 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.37 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.36 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.35 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.34 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.33 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.32 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.31 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.30 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.29 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.28 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.27 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.26 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.25 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.24 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.23 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.22 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.21 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.20 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.19 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.18 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.17 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.16 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.15 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.14 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.13 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.12 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.11 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.10 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.9 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.8 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.7 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.6 | 25 / 25 | |
| 1.6.5 | 25 / 25 |
v1.6.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.49
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.31
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.30
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.