@cubic-dev-ai/cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): Prebuilt binary installer pattern; consistent across all versions of this CLI package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Prebuilt binary installer pattern; consistent across all versions of this CLI package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env spread used to pass environment to child process during binary install; not exfiltration. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @cubic-dev-ai/cli; no plausible typosquat of joi. | ai |
v1.6.1
4 findingsScript: bun ./preinstall.mjs || node ./preinstall.mjs
Script: bun ./postinstall.mjs || node ./postinstall.mjs
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/mrge-io/cubic-cli/blob/c26b12d7022d2f9e2da5fee0baf30e7428de5a3d/postinstall.mjs#L284 282 | stdio: "inherit", 283 | timeout: 300000, > 284 | env: { 285 | ...process.env, 286 | },
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
4 findingsScript: bun ./preinstall.mjs || node ./preinstall.mjs
Script: bun ./postinstall.mjs || node ./postinstall.mjs
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 282 | stdio: "inherit", 283 | timeout: 300000, > 284 | env: { 285 | ...process.env, 286 | },
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.