@cubid/core
Runtime-agnostic Cubid core client for server-side integrations.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Legitimate SDK package; provenance absence is a process gap, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @cubid/core is unrelated to cors; Levenshtein match is coincidental string similarity, not impersonation. | ai |
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: hubert-cormac.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage name '@cubid/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.