@cuboapp/crdt
CRDT for CUBO
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cuboapp/database | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cuboapp/constants | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pg | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files per finding; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals elevate this for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ws | AI (phantom-deps): ws is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.13 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.12 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.11 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.10 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 8 / 3 |
v1.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.