@cyanheads/mailchimp-mcp-server
Draft, test, and send Mailchimp campaigns straight from your MCP client — with audience management, subscriber CRUD, and post-send analytics behind safe-by-default send gates. STDIO or Streamable HTTP.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino-pretty | AI (phantom-deps): pino-pretty is commonly used as a pino transport via string reference in config rather than direct import; this is a known pattern, not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of packages); no other indicators of supply chain risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.5 | 4 / 7 | |
| 0.3.4 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.3.3 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.3.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.3.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 7 |
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.