@cydm/magic-shell
Magic Shell first-party CLI
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ws | AI (phantom-deps): ws is a declared runtime dep; likely used in dist bundle rather than directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cydm/pie | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; likely consumed via dist or re-exported, not a phantom concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cydm/magic-shell-protocol | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; consistent with protocol package used transitively in compiled output. | ai |
v0.1.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.