@czagents/shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): better-sqlite3 is a well-established native SQLite binding; not a suspicious dependency for a shared utilities package. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.10 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.9 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v0.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.