@datadog/browser-rum-nextjs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Datadog org placeholder; 0.0.0 is a namespace reservation pattern for this publisher. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Empty placeholder from established Datadog publisher; sparse metadata is intentional for a reserved namespace package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 7.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.33.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.32.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.33.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.32.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.