@datadog/datadog-ci-plugin-terraform
Datadog CI plugin for `terraform` commands
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/bundle.js | AI (source-diff): Official Datadog CI plugin; bundle.js is a rolldown-generated bundle with SLSA provenance, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase reflects migration to single-file bundle distribution; consistent with prepack script and dep changes. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/bundle.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded string is the llhttp WASM binary bundled via undici; a known, benign pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Datadog migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:simple-git | AI (phantom-deps): simple-git is a declared runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.18.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.17.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.16.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.16.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.15.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.14.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.13.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.13.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 5.12.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 5.12.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 5.11.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 5.10.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 5.9.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 5.9.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 4 / 2 |
v5.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.16.1
2 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.13.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.13.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.