@dathra/runtime
dathra runtime package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/implementation--9ycpkK4.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (tsdown); readable framework code, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/implementation-BJxDV-Wa.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (tsdown); readable framework code, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/implementation-DH4z8Tf-.mjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (tsdown); readable framework code, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/implementation-tS1mgWou.mjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (tsdown); readable framework code, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package is configured for GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; transition from personal account to GHA is expected and attested. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:devalue | AI (phantom-deps): devalue is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep fires because it's used indirectly via bundled output, not a direct import. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.22 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.21 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.20 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.19 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.18 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.17 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.16 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.15 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.14 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.13 | 4 / 8 |
v0.0.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.