@dcl/content-validator
Catalyst content validations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@dcl/content-hash-tree | AI (dependencies): First-party @dcl ecosystem dep; package has SLSA provenance and long track record. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@well-known-components/thegraph-component | AI (dependencies): Known well-known-components ecosystem dep used consistently across Decentraland packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.3.1 | 9 / 6 | |
| 7.2.0 | 9 / 6 | |
| 7.1.2 | 10 / 6 | |
| 7.1.0 | 10 / 6 | |
| 7.0.5 | 10 / 6 | |
| 7.0.4 | 10 / 6 | |
| 6.2.0 | 10 / 6 |
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.