@dcl/playground-assets
Assets package for the [Decentraland Playground](https://playground.decentraland.org/).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@dcl/sdk | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo-local file: dependency to sibling sdk package; expected for this build. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output (webpack-style wrapper), not true obfuscation; consistent with SDK build pipeline. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled dependency code (base64/protobuf helpers), no concrete malicious network+exec behavior found. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established monorepo package from trusted decentralandbot publisher; missing metadata is stylistic, not spam. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from decentralandbot to GitHub Actions reflects CI/CD migration; SLSA provenance attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | rapid-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Automated CI pipeline for a high-frequency package (1097 versions); rapid publish is expected behavior. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@dcl/js-runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org peer dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 49 of 49)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.25.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.24.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.23.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.23.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.23.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.23.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.22.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.21.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.20.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.20.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.20.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.20.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.20.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.19.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.18.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.18.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.17.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.16.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.15.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.15.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.15.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.14.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.13.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.12.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.12.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.12.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 7.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 1 / 0 |
v7.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.24.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.24.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.24.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.22.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.22.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.20.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.20.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.20.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.20.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.15.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.15.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.11
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.10
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.9
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.8
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.7
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.6
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.5
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.4
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.