@ddd-ts/event-sourcing-inmemory
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped monorepo package; no description is a stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is consistent with monorepo automation; SLSA attestation corroborates legitimacy. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation; stable for this monorepo. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publish flow explains missing gitHead; SLSA provenance compensates. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Tiny payload is expected for a monorepo sub-package re-export; not a spam indicator here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ddd-ts/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for re-export packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ddd-ts/shape | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ddd-ts/store-inmemory | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ddd-ts/types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; declared as runtime dep, phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.47 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.46 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.45 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.44 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.43 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.42 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.41 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.40 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.39 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.38 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.37 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.36 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.35 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.34 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.33 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.0.32 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.0.31 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.0.30 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.0.29 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.0.28 | 3 / 6 |
v0.0.47
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.46
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.44
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.43
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.