@ddd-ts/store-inmemory
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation which supersedes gitHead as a supply chain integrity signal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this monorepo going forward. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-package; tiny payload and missing description are structural, not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ddd-ts/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped monorepo package; missing description is consistent across all versions and not a malice indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publish integrity; stable signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.47 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.46 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.45 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.44 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.43 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.42 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.41 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.40 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.39 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.38 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.37 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.36 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.35 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.34 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.33 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.32 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.31 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.30 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.29 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.28 | 1 / 4 |
v0.0.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.44
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.43
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.