@decantr/mcp-server
MCP server for Decantr — exposes design intelligence, packs, and verification to AI coding assistants
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is @decantr/core, a first-party scoped package from the same org; not a suspicious third-party addition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): New package from a monorepo; lack of provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.9.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.8.3 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.8.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.8.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.8.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.6.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.6.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.4.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.4.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 0 |
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (davidaimi) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (davidaimi) on 2026-07-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.