@decantr/registry
Registry contracts, schemas, API client, and content utilities for Decantr
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is an in-house @decantr sibling package, not third-party. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/content-types-202FZ5NY.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Generated .d.ts with long type union lines, not obfuscated executable code. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@decantr/content | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package under same @decantr scope/monorepo. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/content-types-DwtDHEEE.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file; long lines are wide type unions, not obfuscation. Stable false positive for this build output pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is confirmed by SLSA attestation; consistent with org-level automation adoption. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): gitHead absence is expected when publishing via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance instead of manual npm publish. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.9.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.9.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.9.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.8.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 |
v3.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.0
3 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): Publisher changed from GitHub Actions to manual publish; provenance regression is a strong compromise indicator for this package.) This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
This version was published by a different npm account (davidaimi) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-02, but davidaimi is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.