@decantr/verifier
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.9.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.9.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.9.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.9.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.8.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.8.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.8.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.6.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.6.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.5.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.5.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.5.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.5.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.4.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.4.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.1.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.0.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 2.5.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.5.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.4.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.3.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.2.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 2 |
v3.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (davidaimi) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (davidaimi) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.