@dedot/codegen
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:handlebars | AI (dependencies): handlebars is a well-known templating library; its use in a codegen package is expected and stable. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-package; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal tooling packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established dedot monorepo; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.18.8 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.18.6 | 10 / 0 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.