@deephaven-enterprise/jsapi-types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Deephaven enterprise package; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across all 238 versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.1.37 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.36 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.35 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.34 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.33 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.32 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.31 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.1.30 | 1 / 0 |
v2026.1.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.1.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.1.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.