@deephaven/jsapi-types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for this org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD migration is consistent with the Deephaven org's publishing workflow change, not a takeover. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 41.7.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.6.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.5.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.4.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.3.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 41.0.0 | 0 / 2 |
v41.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v41.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.