@devvit/settings
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo internal package; sparse metadata is expected across all @devvit/* releases. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent pattern across @devvit/* monorepo packages; not a spam indicator here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across @devvit/* suite; stable pattern for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.13.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.13.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.24 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.23 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.22 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.21 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.20 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.17 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.16 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.15 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.5 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.4 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.3 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.12.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.11.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.11.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.11.17 | 2 / 6 |
v0.13.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (colacadstink) than the most recent previously approved version (devvit-cli-bot) on 2026-05-26, but colacadstink is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.12.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.