@dexto/tools-lifecycle
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@dexto/core | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dependency; expected pattern for @dexto/* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@dexto/agent-config | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dependency; expected pattern for @dexto/* packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @dexto/* packages; no other risk signals present. | ai |
v1.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.