@dfinity/agent
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): dfn-it-owner is the established DFINITY org publisher with 27 approved packages; transition from bitdivine appears to be a legitimate org account migration. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): DFINITY publishes via CI/CD with SLSA provenance; this is expected and a strong positive signal for all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v3.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.