@dfosco/tiny-canvas
A lightweight React canvas with draggable elements and persistent positions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@neodrag/react | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled library; declared in dependencies and compiled into dist, not directly imported in source. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.12.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.11.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.11.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.11.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.11.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.10.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.9.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 4 |
v4.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.