@digitalbazaar/ecdsa-rdfc-2019-cryptosuite
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established digitalbazaar org package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 25 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 25 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 25 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 22 |
v1.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (gannan) than the most recent previously approved version (dlongley) on 2024-11-25, but gannan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.