@digitalbazaar/ecdsa-xi-2023-cryptosuite
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established digitalbazaar org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 4 / 22 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 22 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 22 |
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (dlongley) than the most recent previously approved version (davidlehn) on 2024-02-15, but dlongley is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.