@digitalbazaar/ed25519-signature-2020
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signal is from co-maintainer mattcollier's other packages; this is a legitimate cryptography library from digitalbazaar org. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.4.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 5.3.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 5.2.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 5.1.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 19 |
v5.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.2.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (davidlehn) than the most recent previously approved version (dlongley) on 2023-02-13, but davidlehn is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.