@digitaldefiance/mongoose-types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.20.9 | 1 / 3 | |
| 8.20.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 8.20.7 | 1 / 3 | |
| 8.20.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 8.20.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 8.20.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.20.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.20.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.20.1 | 0 / 4 |
v8.20.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.20.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.20.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.