@dile/icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped SVG icon package unrelated to cors; Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 0 |
v2.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.