@dnd-kit-svelte/accessibility
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/hanielu | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub URL, not an email address; domain-hijack risk does not apply. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@dnd-kit-svelte/utilities | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dependency; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:runed | AI (phantom-deps): Svelte library dependency likely used in .svelte files not caught by static import analysis. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:esm-env | AI (phantom-deps): esm-env is a common Svelte ecosystem utility; phantom-dep is a stable false positive for Svelte packages. | ai |
v0.0.11
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.