@dnd-kit-svelte/svelte
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/hanielu | AI (email-domain): Author field uses a GitHub URL as contact, not an email domain; no real domain hijack risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.6 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.1.5 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 9 |
v0.1.6
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.