@dnd-kit-svelte/utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/hanielu | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub URL, not an email address; domain-hijack risk does not apply. | ai |
v0.0.11
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/HanielU' uses domain 'https://github.com/hanielu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.