@domql/element
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established @domql monorepo package with 556 versions; dormancy likely reflects project cadence, not takeover. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Missing metadata is consistent across the @domql package family; not indicative of spam or malice. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable false positive for @domql scoped packages which consistently omit descriptions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-lived monorepo package; no provenance is consistent across all versions. | ai |
v3.8.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.32.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.