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@dpeluche/trs-cli-linux-x64

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trs binary for linux x64

31
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

dpeluche

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a platform binary distribution; the 'trs' binary is the intended artifact, attested via SLSA provenance. ai

Versions (showing 31 of 31)

Version Deps Published
0.6.15 0 / 0
0.6.14 0 / 0
0.6.13 0 / 0
0.6.12 0 / 0
0.6.11 0 / 0
0.6.10 0 / 0
0.6.9 0 / 0
0.6.8 0 / 0
0.6.7 0 / 0
0.6.6 0 / 0
0.6.5 0 / 0
0.6.4 0 / 0
0.6.3 0 / 0
0.6.2 0 / 0
0.6.1 0 / 0
0.6.0 0 / 0
0.5.16 0 / 0
0.5.15 0 / 0
0.5.14 0 / 0
0.5.13 0 / 0
0.5.12 0 / 0
0.5.9 0 / 0
0.5.8 0 / 0
0.5.7 0 / 0
0.5.6 0 / 0
0.5.5 0 / 0
0.5.4 0 / 0
0.5.3 0 / 0
0.5.2 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.5.0 0 / 0

v0.6.15

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.14

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.13

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.12

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.8

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.6

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.5

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.4

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.3

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.6.2

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.6.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.6.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.16

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.15

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.14

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.12

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.9

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.8

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.7

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.6

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.4

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.3

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.2

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • trs

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.