@draht/gateway
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.4.26 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2026.4.25 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2026.4.23 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2026.4.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2026.3.25 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2026.3.14 | 1 / 2 |
v2026.4.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.4.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.4.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.3.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.