@dwtechs/checkard
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:http://www.lcluber.com/contact | AI (email-domain): Author used a URL as the email field; lcluber.com is the author's real site, not an unclaimed domain. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.6.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.5.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.5.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.4.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.4.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.3.0 | 0 / 12 |
v3.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.