@dwtechs/hashitaka
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:http://www.lcluber.com/contact | AI (email-domain): Author field is a URL, not an email; domain check is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@dwtechs/winstan | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep declared in dependencies; likely used indirectly or via dist bundle. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 5 |
v0.3.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.