@dwtechs/winstan
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:http://www.lcluber.com/contact | AI (email-domain): Email field contains a contact URL, not an email address; domain-hijack risk is not applicable here. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:winston | AI (typosquat): Package is an intentional winston wrapper; name similarity is by design, not impersonation. | ai |
v0.7.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
3 findingsPackage name '@dwtechs/winstan' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'winston'.
Maintainer email 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' uses domain 'http://www.lcluber.com/contact' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.