@dxos/app-framework

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.

HTTP request to raw IP address — legitimate packages use domain names 55 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://localhost:5173/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 56 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://LOCALHOST/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); > 57 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://127.0.0.1:8080/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 58 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://[::1]:8080/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 59 | });

HTTP request to raw IP address — legitimate packages use domain names 61 | it('rejects public and malformed URLs', ({ expect }) => { 62 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://example.com/plugin.mjs')).toBe(false); > 63 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://192.168.1.10/plugin.mjs')).toBe(false); 64 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('not a url')).toBe(false); 65 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('')).toBe(false);

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (dxos-bot) on 2026-07-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.

HTTP request to raw IP address — legitimate packages use domain names 55 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://localhost:5173/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 56 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://LOCALHOST/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); > 57 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://127.0.0.1:8080/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 58 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('http://[::1]:8080/plugin.mjs')).toBe(true); 59 | });

HTTP request to raw IP address — legitimate packages use domain names 61 | it('rejects public and malformed URLs', ({ expect }) => { 62 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://example.com/plugin.mjs')).toBe(false); > 63 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('https://192.168.1.10/plugin.mjs')).toBe(false); 64 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('not a url')).toBe(false); 65 | expect(UrlLoader.isLocalUrl('')).toBe(false);

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (dxos-bot) on 2026-06-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.