@dynamic-labs/assert-package-version
Utility to assert package versions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is a documented CI/CD migration pattern for this established org; stable going forward. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 211)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.18.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.18.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.17.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.16.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.15.0 | 1 / 0 |
v4.18.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.