@dynamic-labs/ethereum-aa
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from named account to GitHub Actions reflects CI/CD automation; stable pattern for this org's SDK packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Dynamic Labs publishes via GitHub Actions CI without Sigstore attestation; consistent across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 211)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.18.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.18.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.18.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.18.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.18.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.17.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 4.16.0 | 12 / 0 |
v4.18.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.18.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.18.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.18.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.