@dynoxide/darwin-x64
Dynoxide binary for darwin x64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD adoption; SLSA provenance attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a platform binary distribution; bundled binary is the entire purpose of the package. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.6 | 0 / 0 |
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.