@e-llm-studio/test-citation
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-konva | AI (phantom-deps): Established corporate UI library; phantom-dep likely due to bundled/tree-shaken output not importing directly. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@craco/craco | AI (phantom-deps): craco is used in scripts (start/test/eject) not source imports; phantom-dep false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pdf-collaborative-tool | AI (phantom-deps): May be used indirectly or conditionally; no install scripts or malicious indicators found. | ai |
v0.0.120
4 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.111
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.