@e9n/pi-cron
Cron scheduler extension for pi — schedule recurring prompts as isolated subprocesses
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
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Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Passing process.env to child_process.spawn is standard for subprocess scheduling; not a secret-leak risk in this context. | ai |
v0.2.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 97 | cwd, 98 | stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"], > 99 | env: { ...process.env }, 100 | timeout: timeoutMs, 101 | });
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.