@eat-pray-ai/wingman
Showcase your AI pair usage — SVG cards, résumés, and more
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with CI/CD automation adoption. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bootstrap-icons | AI (phantom-deps): bootstrap-icons used in SVG/template generation, not direct JS import; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 6 |
v0.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.