@echogarden/icu-segmentation-wasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): WASM binary is the documented deliverable of this segmentation library. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of provenance is common (~88% of packages); no other risk signals present to elevate this concern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 1 |
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • wasm/icu-segmentation.wasm
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.